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Abstract  
One of the fundamental aspects for an efficient Grid usage is the optimization of resource allocation 
among the participants. However, this has not yet materialized. Each user is a self-interested 
participant trying to maximize his utility whereas the utility is not only determined by the fastest 
completion time, but on the prices as well. Future revenues are influenced by users’ reputation. 
Reputation mechanisms help to build trust between loosely coupled and geographically distributed 
participants. Providers need an incentive to reduce selfish cancellation of jobs and privilege own jobs. 
In this paper we present a reputation-based pricing mechanism for a simple, but fair pricing of 
resources. In e-Science researchers do not appreciate idiosyncratic pricing strategies and policies. 
Their interest lies in doing research in an efficient manner. Consequently, in our mechanism the price 
is tightly coupled to the reputation of a site to guarantee fairness of pricing and facilitate price 
determination. Furthermore, the price is not the only parameter as completion time plays an important 
role, when deadlines have to be met. We provide a flexible utility and decision model for every 
participant and analyze the outcome of our reputation-based pricing system via simulation.  
Keywords: Grid computing, reputation, pricing, incentives. 
 
 
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Grid computing is a promising paradigm for sharing IT-resources in large-scale geographically 
distributed systems through collaboration (Foster, Kesselman 2001). It enables to use software and 
hardware infrastructures from other institutes for an effective sharing of heterogeneous computing 
resources, data or even high-performance and complex services (Joseph et al. 2004). The collaboration 
in the particle physics Grid Community has been facilitated by virtual organizations (VO) like Atlas or 
LHCb (Berlich et al. 2005). Scientists are associated with virtual organizations, which is a loosely-
coupled team of people working in the same or closely related projects. They work on the same 
infrastructure with an interoperable application environment. One of the fundamental aspects of an 
efficient Grid usage is the optimization of resource allocation among the participants. However, this 
has not yet materialized. Users tend to send one job several times to the Grid to assure that evaluable 
results will be returned. The redundant job submission blocks resources, which potentially could be 
allocated to other, more important jobs. Moreover, site administrators hesitate to always provide all 
the resources to the VO, in case an internal job is waiting. Then, the instant allocation of the internal 
job is preferred. This behaviour is comparable to free-riding behaviour in P2P-networks (Adar, 
Huberman 2000). By introducing prices for jobs the behaviour can be redirected avoiding free-riding. 
Apparently, we have a conflict in goals. Users are interested in satisfying their resource demand as 
quickly as possible while the overall goal is to provide a fair and efficient resource sharing. On the 
supply side providers try to get as much jobs as possible for the highest price they can achieve. Each 
user is a self-interested participant trying to maximize his utility whereas the utility is not only 
determined by the fastest completion time, but on the prices as well. 
Self-interested agents can lead to inefficient market outcome. Enforcing authorities are not always able 
to detect and punish misbehaviour. Reputation mechanisms help to build trust between loosely 
coupled and geographically distributed participants (Resnick et al. 2000, Dellarocas 2003) to avoid a 
market of lemons (Akerlof 1970). Future revenues are influenced by users’ reputation based on the 
behaviour of all participants. In Grid networks, the incorrect results returned by a finished job do not 
reveal information, whose fault it was. On the one hand, the provider could have aborted the job. On 
the other hand, the consumer could have made mistakes in programming the job. Thus, reputation 
mechanisms have to provide tailored metrics to rate provider and consumer. Providers need an 
incentive to reduce selfish cancellation of jobs, while consumers have to thoroughly analyze their jobs, 
before they submit them. 
In this paper we present a reputation-based pricing mechanism for a simple, but fair pricing of 
resources. In e-Science researchers do not appreciate idiosyncratic pricing strategies and policies. 
Their interest lies in doing research in an efficient manner. Consequently, in our mechanism the price 
is tightly coupled to the reputation of a site to guarantee fairness of pricing and facilitate price 
determination.  Furthermore, the price is not the only parameter as completion time plays an important 
role, when deadlines have to be met. In (Dellarocas 2003) one of the research questions for reputation 
mechanisms is how they affect the behaviour of participants in a community. We provide a flexible 
utility and decision model for every participant and analyze the outcome of our reputation-based 
pricing system via simulation. The goal is to enhance collaboration and trust in the Grid community 
(Ranganathan et al. 2004). 
 
2 SCENARIO  
The community in the particle physics Grid is based on trust between the institutes. Institutes are 
comprised of several researchers. Researchers typically analyze data and need thus huge amounts of 
computation power to run simulations and calculations. Therefore, they share resources with other 
institutes and have the option to schedule their jobs either on the local machine or to send it to an 
  
external site. It depends on the queue length estimation when the job will be finished. Researchers 
submit their jobs to external sites and anticipate their job will be finished within the expected timeline. 
Obviously, the jobs of internal users are always more important than jobs of external users due to 
selfish manner. Thus, sites tend to cancel current running jobs, if there is an important internal job to 
process. Nowadays, there are no incentives why running jobs of external users should not be cancelled 
as the institutes do not gain from this job. Users do not have to reciprocate (e.g. payment) to use the 
Grid resources. Consequently, job requesters will inefficiently consume the offered resource by 
sending jobs redundantly to the Grid. Figure 1 illustrates the advantage for the consumer sending his 
job J10 redundantly to several machines. On two of the three foreign machines the job is not executed 
properly. These jobs are of no value for the consumer. He expects that the other two jobs will deliver 
valuable results. Without compensation payment he always has the incentive for redundant job 
submission to avoid the risk of job loss. However, J10 delays other jobs (e.g. J11), which could be 
more important. 
 
 
Figure 1. Four jobs are sent to the Grid network. Only two jobs will deliver valuable results. 
 
The goal of the system is to achieve a fair allocation of resources and enforce obedient behaviour of 
the participating agents. Generating a reliable Grid platform in the e-Science community for 
distributed resource sharing and collaboration requires mechanisms to solicit and predict resource 
contributions of individual users (Buragohain et al. 2003). Buragohain suggested an incentive 
mechanism for P2P file sharing, where users with higher service provision have a higher probability to 
be accepted by others for downloading files. Every user has costs for offering files and he can gain 
from offered files by other users. The approach in this paper is to differentiate between the services a 
user provides. A user with a high contribution is more likely to be accepted than a user with a low 
contribution. This analysis framework can be used to identify the benefit of participating in the 
network after the transaction. Burgahoin’s game theoretic analysis framework is not applicable for 
Grid Computing, since it does not consider that CPU sharing is not reusable for one timeslot. In P2P 
networks a file can be downloaded by several peers at the same time (parallel resource usage). 
Subsequently, the assignment of resources does not only depend on his provision level, but also on the 
available resources at the requested timeslot. Moreover, we do not reject requests based on probability. 
Jobs, which have been submitted to a site, must be accepted. 
The introduction of payment can solve the problem of inefficient resource usage. Every user has to 
pay a certain amount of money to receive resources. The amount of money has to be limited, since real 
money in scientific Grid networks is undesirable. Instead virtual currencies or credits can be 
implemented like Karma or Nuglets (Vishnumurthy et al. 2003; Buttyan and Hubaux 2001). This 
induces further problems as virtual credits are used to price resources. Users or site administrators 
  
have to decide, how to determine the price of a resource depending on capacity, demand and 
availability of resources. This entire process requires time, which distracts from research. Another 
option is to have a fixed price for resources, e.g. 1 credit per CPU/minute. The prices need not be 
determined dynamically and an incentive is provided to stop overconsumption of resources. However, 
fixed price fail to set incentives to behave compliantly as site administrator can cancel job at any time. 
They will accept a short-term loss in payment made by the current running job. In this case the own 
job, which has to be finished before the deadline and has a higher valuation than the fixed payment, 
will replace the running job. In this paper a fixed-price scheme is extended by a reputation mechanism 
to enhance incentives for collaboration in the Grid network. Prices usually reflect the supply and 
demand. The proposed pricing is advantageous as it reflects the service level. An automatic adaptation 
of the price according to users’ behaviour allows setting the right incentives for collaborative work 
resulting in an improved exchange of resources. Furthermore, a decision framework for cancelling a 
job is presented to depict the scenario in a scientific Grid network. 
 
3 REPUTATIONS-BASED SCHEDULING AND PRICING 
The main idea has been derived from (Jurca and Faltings 2005), where the authors propose a 
reputation-based pricing for services in P2P networks based on the provided quality of service. 
Deadlines and completion time are not considered in their utility function and thus not suited for Grid. 
Our utility function comprises these parameters. We adapted the online scheduling mechanisms from 
(Porter 2004) and (Heydenreich et al. 2006). Porter’s utility function is not based on the length of the 
job, but on the valuation for the job. The mechanism contemplates when and how a job has to be 
submitted and users can report true or false values for job length or job valuation. We assume that a 
long job has a bigger impact and a higher risk to be cancelled than a short job and the values of a job 
are reported truthfully. Typically, long jobs comprise high effort in programming and thus the impact 
of the results is high. Due to their long running time the probability increases that the job will be 
cancelled. Moreover, the formal analysis of Porter is based on mechanism design for a single machine, 
whereas in our case we consider m machines in a simulation. Heydenreich et al. propose a mechanism 
called Decentralized LocalGreedy Algorithm (DLGM). There is no central planner to allocate jobs to 
the different nodes. Instead, jobs ask for the completion time and payment on each machine and decide 
on which machine they want to be scheduled. Jobs can report a value for their job and get a higher 
priority and be executed earlier than previously allocated jobs. Deadlines of the jobs are not taken into 
account. Furthermore, the option that a user (or the machine owner) can cancel the current running job 
was not analyzed. It makes a new option for decision available.  
In e-Science Grid users are researchers who are sending jobs to the Grid consume subsequently from 
other Grid research institutes. In our model we will consider sites as consumer and provider. Other 
papers (i.e. Kwok et al. 2005) distinguish between provider and consumer as two different 
persons/institutes, whereas in our case the decision model is depending on both roles (i.e. Buragohain 
et al. 2003). Thus, sending and receiving jobs has an impact on the decision for a site in both roles. To 
distinguish between the provider and consumer role we will name the consumer as jobs and provider 
as machines. Jobs and machines can belong to the same user. For simplicity, this model implies 
without loss of generality that one site has only one user, where every user has a reputation. The 
calculation of the reputation value is not fixed to a certain scheme. Promising examples for reputation 
mechanisms are (Alunkal et al. 2004) for Grid networks as well as (Xiong and Liu 2004) and (Kamvar 
et al. 2003) known from P2P networks. Similar to the mentioned examples we assume that users in 
Grid report the feedback truthfully and act rationally. 
 
  
3.1 Parameter 
Preferences of a user are expressed by the utility function. It is crucial for defining the relation 
between the loss and the benefit of a job on a machine at a certain time. Besides obvious and essential 
characteristics of a utility function further requirements have to be met: 
1. A job which is completed after the deadline has a value of zero. It does not have any value for 
the user, if the job is finished too late. 
2. The risk of a job cancellation increases, if the provider has a lower reputation.  
3. The cancellation of a job must have a direct impact on the future income.  
We consider a scenario with a set of Gridagents A = {1 … a}, who participate in the network by 
providing resources and submitting jobs. Resources are homogeneous. Every agent a can send one or 
more jobs ja to the Grid in one timeslot T = {1 … t}. The jobs are defined by a processing time pj > 0 
(runtime of job), and a deadline dj > 0 (when the job should be finished). The incoming jobs are 
always able to meet the deadline, if they are instantly started. Every job requests the machines in the 
network (M = {1…m} with a=m) for their queue time qjm(t). This approach is comparable to the 
DLGM setting (Heidenreich et al. 2006). The completion time Cj(m) is defined as ܥ௝ሺ݉ሻ ൌ ݌௝ೣ௠ ൅
ݍ௝௠ሺݐሻ, where ݌௝ೣ௠ denotes the remaining time for the current running job jx from agent x on machine 
m. Every machine has a reputation value rm ∈ [0,1]. 
Porter proposed a utility function based on a hard deadline. Every user has an expectation about the 
latest finishing date of a job. The job is worthless, if it is finished after the deadline and it is thus 
cancelled (Porter 2004). We do not abort jobs, if they are waiting in the queue and probably will not 
match the deadline. We assume that jobs can still match the deadline, if preceding jobs are cancelled 
and replaced by shorter jobs. Then, the completion time will be reduced. The option of cancellation is 
only considered, if a new job cannot be finished before the deadline. The valuation for the job’s laxity 
is determined by the parameter Vj . Thus, the utility is defined as  
௝ܷ௠ሺݐሻ ൌ ߤ ൬ܦ௝ ൒
ଵ
ඥ௥೘ሺ௧ሻ
ܥ௝௠ሺݐሻ ൅ ݐ൰ כ ௝ܸ െ  ߨ௝௠ሺݐሻ. 
We use the notation according to Porter, where μ(⋅) is an indicator function, which returns 1, if the 
argument is true, and zero otherwise (requirement 1). The deadline should be bigger than the sum of 
the completion time and the current timeslot. Furthermore, every machine is evaluated by the risk of 
job cancellation. We introduce a risk factor ଵ
ඥ௥೘ሺ௧ሻ
 to fulfil requirement 2. If the machine has a high 
reputation, the job will more likely be finished before deadline. ߨ௝௠ሺݐሻ is the total payment job j pays 
to the machine m. We propose a reputation-based pricing, which enables a direct price determination 
based on the reputation of the provider. A provider with a higher reputation will consequently receive 
a higher income per timeslot. If the reputation decreases, the price will decrease, too. Let the price per 
timeslot be ݒ௝௠ሺݐሻ: [rmin, rmax] → √ (requirement 3). In the remainder of this paper it is simplified to 
ݒ௝௠ሺݐሻ = rm (t)∈ [0, 1]. The total payment of a user to the machine m is ߨ௝௠ሺݐሻ ൌ ݌௝ כ ݒ௠ሺݐሻ. A 
consumer can rate the provider depending on, if the job was cancelled, finished too late or successfully 
returned. The provider is not rated negative, if the deadline was matched, although the promised 
finishing date was delayed. At the beginning of the allocation the price is set accordingly to the 
reputation. The utility of a job can be positive or negative, since the payment can be higher than the 
valuation of a job. On contrary, the definition of DLGM only allows negative utility. 
 
 
  
3.2 Sellers’ and buyers’ action space 
When a job is created, the agent has the action space S for the job with S = {run job on own machine, 
run job on foreign machine, cancel running job of other agent}. Usually, the third option is the best, if 
no reputation and prices are considered, since the agent is not punished for his misbehaviour. We only 
consider the option to cancel the running job. The replacement of a job in the queue is not taken into 
account in this setting.  
 
 
Figure 2. Decision process of the user 
 
The decision process is as follows. At first, the agent calculates the utility, if his job is scheduled on 
his machine. Although the agent does not have to pay himself (ߨ௝௠ሺݐሻ = 0), the agent has opportunity 
costs, since no other foreign jobs can run on this machine and the income is missing for this period of 
time. In the next step he analyses whether a better utility can be gained by running the job on a foreign 
machine. The completion time has to be lower, because the price decreases the utility (ߨ௝௠ሺݐሻ ≥ 0) 
compared to scheduling on his machine. As third option users have the ability to cancel running jobs 
on their own machine while processing their job instantly (figure 2). This is a big advantage, when 
queues are very long due to high demand and the completion time of a job extends the deadline on all 
machines, e.g. it does not get finished within time. We assume that a user would never cancel his own 
job on his machine. From the consumer perspective it is only attractive for the consumer to schedule 
his job on another machine, once the current running job is not from another provider. Otherwise, it is 
reasonable to cancel the running job, because he will obtain the lowest completion time (without 
reputation and payment). On the one hand, payments decrease the benefit of scheduling the job on 
another machine, since for the own site the user is not required to pay. Consequently, it is less 
attractive to send jobs to others. On the other hand, the cancellation of jobs results in a negative 
outcome for the machine owner, because he will not receive any payments and he will be punished by 
a lower reputation. Queues on other machines may comprise fewer jobs and thus attract users to 
schedule their jobs on other machines. 
By missing the deadline the results of a job create no value. Henceforth, the provider faces two effects: 
payment and reputation loss. Payment loss arises by replacing the current running job by a new job 
and delaying other jobs in the queue. Delay can result in missing the deadline. Finished jobs beyond 
deadline are not being paid. The loss is calculated by summing up the excepted payment for all 
delayed jobs including the cancelled job: ݈௠
ௗ௘௟௔௬௅௢௦௦ሺݐሻ ൌ ∑ ߨ௞௠ሺݐሻ כ
ொ
௞ୀଵ ߤ൫ܦ௝ ൏ ܥመ௝௠ሺݐሻ ൅ ݐ൯.  
  
Delayed jobs and the cancelled job have the opportunity to rate the provider. Apparently, they will 
submit a negative rating and the provider will face a reputation loss. The number of negative ratings is 
ܴ௠
௡௘௚ሺݐሻ ൌ ∑ ߤ൫ܦ௝ ൏ ܥመ௝௠ሺݐሻ ൅ ݐ൯
ொ
௞ୀଵ . Depending on the reputation mechanism the negative ratings 
will lower the reputation of agent a possessing machine m. Then, the agent has to collect ܴ௠
௣௢௦ሺݐሻ 
positive ratings to regain his former reputation. ܴ௠
௣௢௦ሺݐሻ is the number of required jobs, which rate the 
machine positively. ܴ௠
௡௘௚ሺݐሻ and ܴ௠
௣௢௦ሺݐሻ need not be equal, i.e. in asymmetric reputation mechanisms, 
where it is more difficult to receive a good reputation than a bad reputation. Next, it has to be analyzed 
how long it will take to receive the required jobs. As there are jobs already in the queue meeting the 
deadline the number of required jobs for obtaining the old reputation value is ܬመ௠ ሺݐሻ ൌ ܴ௠
௣௢௦ሺݐሻ െ
∑ ߤ൫ܦ௝ ൒ ܥመ௝௠ሺݐሻ ൅ ݐ൯
ொ
௞ୀଵ . Since the machine will have a lower income due to the reputation loss and 
thus a lower price, the compensation is based on the current queued jobs and the incoming rate λ෠  of 
jobs on the machine m in the future timeslot. Let the prospective jobs arrive according to a predefined 
distribution and have a processing time equalling the mean ݌ҧ. The incoming rate of jobs is derived 
from the history. We assume that jobs will arrive according to former income rate. We use the 
exponential smoothing method to predict the jobs arriving in the future. Subsequently, the number of 
expected jobs arriving in timeslot t+1 is ܬ௠ሺݐ ൅ 1ሻ ൌ  ߙ כ ݕ௧ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ כ ܬ௠ሺݐሻ  . The required number 
of timeslots to restore the old reputation encompasses the duration of all jobs in the queue and the 
expected runtime of future jobs: ݐ௠
௥௘௤௨௜௥௘ௗ ൌ ݌ҧ כ ܬመ௠ ሺݐሻ+∑ ݌௞
ொ
௞ୀଵ . The jobs, which arrive before the 
reputation is restored, create a loss for the provider, since they have to pay a lower price.  
The reputation value including ܴ௠
௡௘௚ሺݐሻ ratings ݎ௠
௡௘௚ሺݐሻ and the current value is  ݎ௠
௣௢௦ሺݐሻ. We average 
the price the incoming jobs have to pay until ݐ௠
௥௘௤௨௜௥௘ௗ  by  ݒ௝௠ሺݐሻ ൌ
௥೘
೛೚ೞሺ௧ሻି௥೘
೙೐೒ሺ௧ሻ
ଶ
. Knowing the 
number of expected jobs and the excepted payment, the expected loss can be determined, if the agent 
cancels the running job: ௝݈௠
௥௘௣௅௢௦௦ሺݐሻ ൌ ݐ௠
௥௘௤௨௜௥௘ௗ כ ݒ௝௠ሺݐሻ.  
The total utility for cancelation is ௝ܷ௠௖௔௡௖௘௟ሺݐሻ ൌ ߤ൫ܦ௝ ൒ ݌௝ሺݐሻ ൅ ݐ൯ כ ௝ܸ െ ݈௠
ௗ௘௟௔௬௅௢௦௦ሺݐሻ െ ௝݈௠
௥௘௣௅௢௦௦ሺݐሻ. 
Users can decide whether the utility gained by the cancellation exceeds the utility of a regularly 
scheduled job. In our simulation we only consider this option, when the job will fail the deadline due 
to large queues. 
 
3.3 Reputation mechanism 
The selection of a reputation mechanism is crucial for the mechanism. Different reputation mechanism 
will influence the user’s decision function. The authors of (Marti and Garcia-Molina 2006) provide a 
taxonomy for identifying properties of reputation mechanisms to choose the right mechanism for the 
right setting. Although the taxonomy was mainly developed for P2P networks, it is applicable for Grid 
networks as well. They distinguish between information gathering, scoring and ranking and response. 
The first category comprises the precondition to create identities, the information sources and the level 
of information detail. Scoring and ranking defines the input data and the output data of a reputation 
mechanism. Response is the action a user can take or the action space a user is limited to, i.e. users 
who have a low contribution level also have a low download capacity in P2P networks.  
In the particle physics Grid we deal with registered identities, which have to be certified by a 
certification authority. This process is only for authorising the user to participate in the network. The 
site administrator is unaware of whom the current running job belongs to. Jobs are mapped by a proxy 
identifier, which is managed by the resource broker. Thus, the circumvention of the reputation 
mechanism like whitewashing and Sybil attacks (Cheng and Friedman 2005) are impossible in Grid 
networks, since every certificate application is thoroughly analyzed by several authorities. However, 
the consumer is unknown to the provider due to anonymity. Information sources can either be local 
  
reputation or global reputation. In this paper we restrict our attention to global reputation, since we 
have centralized authority to gather and disseminate this information and we assume to have agents 
rating honestly (Marti and Garcia-Molina 2006; Sonnek and Weissman 2005). The level of 
information detail will be reduced to aggregated information about former behaviour to keep it as 
simple as possible. The reputation will be represented by a single value. Strategic behaviour based on 
the former actions is not taken into account. The input data for computing the reputation value weigh 
current ratings higher than old ones. (Jurca and Faltings 2005) preferred an even simpler mechanism 
by deriving the reputation value as follows: ௡௨௠௕௘௥ ௢௙ ௚௢௢ௗ ௥௔௧௜௡௚௦
௡௨௠௕௘௥ ௢௙ ௧௢௧௔௟ ௥௔௧௜௡௚௦
. We apply this simple reputation 
mechanism as in (Jurca and Faltings 2005; Sonnek and Weissman 2005) and adapt it with a 
straightforward decay function (Azzedin and Maheswaran 2002; Alunkal et al 2004). The rationale 
behind this is that older reputations are less important (Zacharia et al 1999). The quasi-decay function 
takes only the last g ratings and weights them equally. This approach induces that the order of the 
submitted rating is essential. Thus, ratings, which came in first, will be excluded first after g ratings.  
 
4 SIMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
In this section, we present the first results from our simulation. Our results show that reputation-based 
pricing gains higher exchange of resources and less cancellation of jobs than fixed price schemes. 
 
4.1 Setting 
Currently the particle physics researchers do not have to pay for the usage of Grid resources. We 
therefore set up a scenario without payment and a scenario including reputation based pricing. The 
agents are fully trusted at the beginning.  They start with a reputation value ݎ௠ሺ0ሻ = 1. The simulation 
is round-based and comprised 1000 rounds in each 20 runs. Every round jobs were created according 
to a Poisson distribution with λ=0.25 for each agent. 50 agents were providing their resources and 
interacting with each other. Jobs had a completion time and stayed on a machine until the job was 
done or cancelled. The job processing time was derived from a truncated normal distribution with 
mean = 3 and deviation = 2. Only positive durations were allowed. Every job had a deadline which 
was uniformly distributed between 10 and 40 timeslots. The valuation of a job for the job owner was 
uniformly distributed between 1 and 10. A job was of no value, if it was finished after deadline. To 
benchmark the reputation-based pricing we used a fixed price scheme with p = 0, p = 1.0 to 
demonstrate the effect of prices on the scheduling outcome. A fixed price with p = 0 represents the 
current Grid where no payment is necessary. The highest payment in the reputation-based scenario is 
ݎ௠௔௫ = 1. 
 
4.2 Results 
The goal of the proposed mechanism is to show the effect of reputation-based pricing and the benefit 
for the particle physics Grid. One metric is to view the amount of cancelled jobs. The less jobs are 
cancelled, the higher the trust in the network. Table 1 illustrates the results. The reputation-based 
pricing enforces site administrator not to cancel jobs, since their behaviour is documented by the 
reputation. For the fixed price scenarios there is negligible discrepancy between each setting. Overall, 
there were about 900 attempts to cancel a job for fixed prices and about 750 for the reputation-based 
pricing. It encompasses the attempts to cancel the own jobs as well, which was excluded in our setting. 
Consequently, one third of the jobs were cancelled in the fixed price setting and only 5% in the 
reputation-based pricing. This is a significant reduction and a strong enhancement of trust in the Grid 
network.  
  
Another metric considers the number of jobs, which have not met their deadline. Grid users rely on the 
jobs they sent to other sites. When jobs regularly do not meet the deadline due to cancelation users 
will distrust other sites, because participation in the Grid will not be individual rational (Schnizler et al 
2006). Accordingly, jobs waiting in the queue may not meet their scheduled deadlines as in the 
meantime the machine has cancelled the running job in favour of a longer own job. As shown in table 
1 there is a discrepancy between the reputation-based pricing and fixed pricing. The jobs of a user 
running on his machine were always lower than foreign jobs for all four schemes. Job cancellation 
affected queued jobs including own jobs. The loss of own jobs by failing the deadline was taken into 
account. Therefore, users avoided to cancel jobs, when cancellation had an impact on too many own 
jobs in the queue. Looking at all foreign scheduled jobs 98.1% of the jobs were finished successfully 
with the reputation-based pricing scheme. The fixed price schemes are above 93%. The discrepancy 
results from previous two metrics. The overall utility gained from the reputation model was 3% higher 
than the fixed price scheme. A better utility could be achieved by enhancing the agents with more 
intelligent tactics. The selection of sites can be differentiated according to value of a job, reputation, 
deadline and payment in a more detailed approach. Weighing these four parameters can attain a better 
outcome for all agents. Learning algorithms have to be applied in the next step (Erev and Roth 1998; 
Tran and Cohen 2003). 
 
 Number of 
cancelled jobs 
Deadline not matched Finished foreign 
scheduled jobs 
Utility 
  Own jobs Foreign jobs   
Reputation-based pricing 35 6 22 98.1% 103,42% 
Fixprice = 0 301 33 74 94.6% 100,00% 
Fixprice = 0.5 309 28 64 93.3% 100,16% 
Fixprice = 1 328 22 55 93.1% 100,32% 
Table 1. Simulation results. 
 
4.3 Application 
The reputation-based pricing mechanism is currently implemented in a billing infrastructure called 
Billing the Grid (BtG). The goal of this infrastructure is to provide a reputation and billing mechanism 
for particle physics scientists. The introduction of incentives in the scientific Grid will enable an 
efficient utilization of existing resources. Consumers have the incentive to avoid the submission of 
redundant jobs as they have to pay for each job. Site administrators have the incentive to keep jobs 
running and avoid system downtime, since it results in payment loss. This infrastructure provides a 
graphical user interfaces based on the Gridsphere framework (Novotny et al 2004).  
The portlets allow users to submit jobs, get detailed information about the sites and to rate users 
according to their behaviour (figure 3). The portlets send jobs to and receive information from the 
middleware gLite1. Users describe their job requirements in a JDL-file (job description language). The 
resource broker matches the requirements with the available resources and sends the job to the 
according site. Consumers still have the ability to choose a certain site for their job. BtG supports the 
user’s decision by providing additional information about the sites reputation. Beside the reputation-
based payment model and the global reputation, users can maintain a local reputation table. In case, a 
specific type of job is not able to run on a particular machine, they can rate the site with a low 
reputation. Next time, this machine can be avoided, although it has a good global reputation. The 
graphical user interface eases the management of finished jobs, favourable sites and credit account as 
                                              
1 http://www.glite.org 
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